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Fieldwork was conducted among the Kaplan
community in Germany between 1985 and 1993
w i t h funding provided by the Deutsche
F o r s c h u n g s g e m e i n s c h a f t .
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We ste rn  Euro p e
W E R N E R  S C H I F F A U E R
Against Metin Kaplan, self-proclaimed head of the
Caliphate State, proceedings were taken up by the
Oberlandesgericht Dsseldorf in February 2000. The
Ôemir of the believers and caliph of MuslimsÕ had
been charged with incitement for the murder of his
opponent Halil Ibrahim Sofu in Berlin in 1997, and
with running a criminal organization. The process
may very well mark the end of most radical Islamic
group which has developed in the German diaspora
of Turkish migrants.
The End of
t h e Caliphate State?
The Metin
K a p l a n C a s eThe community was founded by Metin Ka-planÔs father, Cemaleddin, in the early 80s as
a breakaway from the National View Ð the
European branch of the National Salvation
Party in Turkey. In 1983-84, the leadership of
the former National Salvation Party split on
the issue of whether the party should be re-
established after the coup dÔtat of 1980. All
parties had been outlawed but now new na-
tional elections were scheduled. When Er-
bakan and the party establishment opted
for the foundation of a successor party (the
Refah (Welfare) Party), a revolutionary wing
headed by Kaplan separated. For them the
history of the coup dÔtat had demonstrated
the limitations of a parliamentary way to an
Islamic rule. As soon as an Islamic party be-
came strong enough to form the govern-
ment and to introduce serious reforms, it
would be suppressed. KaplanÔs teaching can
be summed up under three headings: (1)
Following Sayid Qutb, he proclaimed a revo-
lutionary situation: Turkey was in a state of
barbarity, analogous to the period of
c a h i l i y e t in pre-Muslim Mecca. In this situa-
tion, no compromises with the system were
possible. (2) The revolution could be
achieved by building up an extra-institu-
tional grassroots movement by means of
t e b li ÿg (preaching with words and practice):
On the sole basis of the Koran, the disas-
trous frictions between Muslim communi-
ties worldwide could be overcome, a mass
movement would be established and the
unity of the  m m e t could be restored. (3)
Revolutionary pan-Islamism: The reunifica-
tion of Islam has to start from below with a
coalition/cooperation of all revolutionary Is-
lamic groups (including the Islamic Republic
of Iran). The final aim would be the re-estab-
lishment of the caliphate. The new revolu-
tionary community set up by Kaplan called
itself ÔUnion of the Islamic Communes and
CommunitiesÕ (I
.
s  m  Cemaatleri ve Cemiyet-
leri B i r li ÿg i) .
The movement had a good start. Many
sympathizers of the National View in Europe
were weary of the compromises made by
the party establishment. Typical slogans
were those such as: ÔDoes Islam exist for the
party or does the party exist for Islam?Õ In
many of the mosques established by the Na-
tional View, the Revolutionary wing found a
majority and took over the mosque.
A religious military order
It soon became evident, however, that the
movement was not able to keep up the mo-
mentum it had in the beginning. It re-
mained restricted to the Turkish diaspora
communities in Europe. But even there it
did not appeal in a significant way to Mus-
lims who were not members of the National
View (like member of the S  l e y m a n c õ o r
Nurcu communities). In 1985, the Kaplan
movement stagnated and in 1986 an ero-
sion process began. This process culminat-
ed when Ahmed Polat, one of the founding
members, left the movement together with
a considerable number of followers in 1987.
An erosion process is particularly problem-
atic for a charismatic movement in which
fascination born out of success is of existen-
tial importance. A charismatic movement ei-
ther grows or declines at an exponential
rate. The secession of Polat, therefore, could
have meant the end of the community. In
order to cope with this crucial situation, Ka-
plan re-organized the hitherto rather open
movement into a closed sect.
An issue of crucial importance was the re-
lation of the movement to the Islamic Re-
public of Iran. In the early 80s, the Sunni-
Shia split seemed to be a matter of the past
for many Muslims who were enthusiastic
about the possibilities of Islamic revolu-
tions. However, the Iranian revolution re-
mained a singular event (and became stuck
in the dirty war with Iraq). The hopes for
other revolutions waned. Parallel to disillu-
sionment, the old resentments against Shi-
ites re-surfaced again. After Polat had de-
fended his secession with a criticism of Ka-
planÔs pro-Iranian stance, Kaplan saw him-
self forced to redefine his position. He now
began to insist on the basic dogmatic differ-
ences between Sunna and Shia. This dog-
matic clarification had practical conse-
quences. Kaplan stopped the practices of a
group of enthusiastic believers, who had
sworn an oath of allegiance to Khomeini
and had also insisted on putting up Khome-
ini posters in mosques. Dogmatic clarifica-
tion thus implied centralization, i.e. a
stronger control of the local mosques. In
order to be able to control the mosques
which were spread all over Europe, Kaplan
began to control personally the appoint-
ment of persons in charge (preachers and
heads of mosques). The autonomy the
mosques had enjoyed in the early phase of
the movement thus came to an end. The
drastic changes led to conflicts in the com-
munity and to the divorce from dissenting
members. Kaplan interpreted this process
as one of purification. He thus implied that
the loss of numerical strength was more
than compensated by an increase in spiritu-
al strength: While the fearsome and weak
parted, the strong and courageous re-
mained. A further aspect of this process was
an increased drawing of boundaries. The at-
tendance of mosque services and prayers
also by members of other communities
which had been the practice during the first
years ceased and only members of the Ka-
plan community proper now frequented
the mosque. A more or less exclusive in-
group thus evolved within which increas-
ingly non-conformist positions were devel-
oped, emphasizing the differences to other
Islamic communities.
Ideologically all this was reflected in the
transformation of the movementÕs self-per-
ception: the Kaplan community no longer
conceived itself as a movement open to all
but rather as a closed religious military
order. The steps for becoming initiated
were centered around the institutions:
school (m e d r e s e), mystical convent (t e k k e)
and barracks (k õüsl a k). The sectarian process
culminated in Kaplan declaring himself
locum tenens of the caliph in 1992. He also
proclaimed a government in exile. With this
step, the differences to the other Islamic
communities in Europe became irreconcil-
a b l e .
Kaplan as caliph
The radicalization of the movement went
along with a dramatic change in the social
composition of the community. The first fol-
lowers of Kaplan had been autodidacts of
the first generation, men who had little or
no formal education, who had taught them-
selves to read and write, and who had dis-
covered Islam on their own terms. They had
found in Kaplan a figure that expressed their
scepticism towards the wider society. They
associated KaplanÕs programme with the
hope for the restoration of the unity of Islam
Ð an issue of central importance to them.
Most of these men left Kaplan when he be-
came more sectarian. They realized quite
clearly that any claims to the caliphate were
unacceptable to the other Islamic commu-
nities and would therefore deepen the fric-
tions rather than help to overcome them.
However, younger migrants of the second
generation took their place Ð among them a
considerable number of academics and
high school students. These students intro-
duced new practices into the community.
They set up groups for learning Arabic,
studying Islamic law, learning about the life
of the Prophet, and so on. In short, they de-
veloped a rather academic approach to
Islam, using the intellectual tools they had
acquired in German institutions of higher
education. They stressed truth more than
unity and therefore had fewer problems
with the increasingly sectarian nature of the
community. KaplanÔs success with regard to
the recruitment of new members stabilized
and reinvigorated the community. The
number of members, which had dropped
from approximately 12,000 in 1985 to 1300
in 1992, has remained stable ever since.
The years 1992-1994 saw further develop-
ments toward an elitist cadre party which
increasingly viewed itself as the spearhead
of the Islamic revolution. In 1994, Kaplan fi-
nally declared himself Caliph-proper. This
rather presumptuous step was justified with
the notion of a historical turning point. After
centuries of the decline of Islam, only a
small but powerful elite was left (all other
Muslims being trapped in compromises
with the world). Under the leadership of the
new Caliph, a r e c o n q u i s t a would commence.
Sceptics were reminded of the small num-
ber of believers Muhammed commanded in
the battle of Badr. This construction is char-
acteristic of the hermetic logic that had de-
veloped in the sect during the first half of
the 90s. Although internally coherent, it
could no longer communicated to members
of other Islamic communities.
In 1995, on his deathbed, Cemaleddin Ka-
plan appointed his son Metin as successor
to the Caliphate. Metin, who did not have
the charisma of his father, faced consider-
able problems in the community. In early
1996, the movement split and a counter
caliphate under Ibrahim Sofu was pro-
claimed in Berlin. Both caliphs issued dia-
tribes, brandishing each other as d e c c a l. In
summer 1996, Metin issued a fatwa con-
demning the counter-caliph to death. In
May 1997 Ibrahim was actually killed by a
death squad in his apartment in Berlin. Al-
though Ð of course Ð Metin was under suspi-
cion, nothing could be proven. There is the
suspicion that the murder was committed
by volunteers who had served as mercenar-
ies in Kosovo and in Afghanistan and had
learned to kill in these wars. In October
1998, Turkish authorities claimed (in what
looked very much like a set-up by the Turk-
ish Secret Service) that the police had pre-
vented an attack on the A n õ t k a b i r (the mau-
soleum of Atatrk) during the festivities cel-
ebrating the 75t h anniversary of the revolu-
t i o n .
In 1999, Metin Kaplan was arrested,
though the charges against him seem to
stand on rather shaky grounds. The state at-
torney admitted during the first day of the
trial that a direct link to the murder of
Ibrahim Sofu cannot be established. A con-
viction seems doubtful. But even if the trial
is inconclusive, it is increasingly placing po-
litical pressure on the movement and might
very well mean its end. '
